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POLICY BRIEF 
Efects of Unemployment
Insurance Reforms in Brazil 
Christopher J. O’Leary, Túlio Cravo, Ana Cristina Sierra, and Leandro Justino Veloso 
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS 
 
n  The Brazilian unemployment 
insurance (UI) program, established 
in 1990, is now the largest in Latin 
America. 
n  UI reforms in 2015 increased work 
experience eligibility requirements for 
first- and second-time UI applicants. 
n  Using program administrative 
data to count the number of prior 
UI spells, we estimate the reforms 
reduced layoffs, but by a smaller 
margin than found in earlier studies.
n  We find reductions in layoffs are 
greater for workers with one prior UI 
spell than for first-time claimants.
n  The reforms also reduced the 
likelihood separated workers were 
recalled to their prior employer, 
consistent with less employer-worker 
collusion to collect UI benefits.
For additional details, see the working 
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/318/.
The Brazilian unemployment insurance (UI) program was established in response 
to a severe economic recession in the 1980s. It is now the largest UI program in the 
Latin America and Caribbean region, with more than 40 million benefciaries between 
2012 and 2016. Despite its size, the program operates in a labor market where more 
than one-third of all employees work in informal jobs not covered by UI. Because these 
latter workers receive no benefts when they are separated from their jobs, formal sector 
employment is desirable, and previous research has found signifcant fows of workers 
between the formal and informal sectors and back again, which UI receipt may facilitate. 
In particular, some employers may use UI to subsidize wages of workers they lay of 
and then recall afer UI benefts end. Some laid-of employees even continue to work 
informally in their prior jobs while receiving UI benefts (Van Doornik, Schoenherr, 
and Skrastins 2017). Moreover, the UI program has historically been generous in terms 
of minimal eligibility requirements within the formal sector, which could further 
incentivize such back-and-forth fows. 
Tese features have made Brazil’s UI program relatively expensive, and when a 
recession in 2014 further increased costs, the Brazilian government instituted reforms 
in the eligibility rules to contain future costs. We investigate the efects of two such 
changes in UI eligibility rules in 2015 that increased the work experience requirements 
for frst- and second-time UI applicants. While previous research estimated that these 
reforms signifcantly reduced layofs (Carvalho, Corbi, and Narita 2018), our analysis, 
which relies on more complete administrative records, fnds smaller overall reductions in 
layofs, with somewhat larger decreases for workers with a single prior UI beneft spell. 
A Natural Experiment 
Te recession that began in early 2014, coupled with the institutional features of 
Brazil’s UI program described above, led to calls for reforming the system. Facing 
general budget difculties and anticipating a signifcant rise in unemployment, Brazilian 
President Dilma Roussef issued Provisional Measure 665 in late December of 2014, 
raising UI eligibility requirements for frst- and second time-UI claimants, efective 
March 1, 2015. Soon thereafer, the legislature passed a new law codifying eligibility rules 
nearly as strict as the provisional measure, and this law took efect on June 17, 2015. 
Brazil thus experienced two sudden changes in UI eligibility rules in 2015, although 
these changes applied only for workers on their frst or second UI application; rules for 
the third and subsequent applications were unchanged. Consequently, the reforms were 
targeted toward recent labor market entrants. 
Specifcally, the reforms increased the minimum number of months of employment 
workers needed before they would qualify for the shortest beneft duration on their frst 
or second UI application. Prior to the frst reform, any UI applicant who had worked 6 
months in the prior three years could qualify for three months of benefts (frst row of 
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Table 1  Months of Employment Required for UI Benefts, 1990–2017 
Program costs rose Law 7.998 PM 665 
sharply with the recession Number of UI claim 
Potential 
beneft duration 
(1990 to Feb. 27, 
2015) 
(Feb. 28, 2015 to 
June 16, 2015) 
Law 13.134 
(from June 17, 2015) 
starting in 2014 as more First Three 6 
unemployed workers with 
sufcient experience drew Second 
Four 
Five 
Three 
12 
24 
6 
18 
24 
12 
24 
9 
UI benefts. Four 12 12 12 
Five 24 24 24 
Third or more Three 6 6 6 
Four 12 12 12 
Five 24 24 24 
NOTE: The table shows the number of months of formal employment required in the 36 months before UI 
application to be eligible for benefts, by number of UI claims and regime. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from provisions in Law 7.998, PM 665, and Law 13.134. 
Table 1). Under both reforms, frst- and second-time UI applicants now needed longer 
recent work experience to qualify for the shortest potential beneft duration. For frst-
time claimants, for example, the new minimum potential beneft shifed from 3 to 4 
months, but the required work period increased from 12 to 18 months under the frst 
reform, before returning to 12 months under the second reform, a mere 4 months later. A 
summary of the work requirements for UI beneft eligibility under each set of eligibility 
rules is listed in Table 1. 
Our evaluation focuses on short-tenure workers who were most afected by the 
changes in UI eligibility rules. Using data that contains tenure at the daily level, we 
contrast job layof rates for a treatment group of workers with at least 6 and less than 7 
months of job tenure against a control group of workers with at least 5 and less than 6 
months of job tenure. Under the initial regime, the treatment group with 6 months of 
job tenure was eligible for 3 months of UI benefts but frst- and second-time applicants 
became ineligible for any benefts under both reforms. We estimate how diferences in 
layof risk between the treatment and control groups vary across the diferent regimes, an 
approach called diference-in-diferences. To isolate the impact of the reforms, we further 
adjust for diferences across individuals in their geographic location, calendar month in 
the data, and demographic characteristics. 
Efects on Layofs 
We fnd that the increase in work months needed for UI eligibility reduced employer 
layofs. For short-tenure workers with no prior UI applications, the frst reform reduced 
layof risk by 0.18 percentage points (from a base layof rate of 3.4 percent). Te impact of 
the second reform was larger, cutting layof risk by 0.41 percentage points relative to the 
period before either reform. 
Among workers who had one prior UI application, the reforms had even stronger 
impacts, with the frst reform reducing layof risk by 0.9 percentage points (from a base 
layof rate of 4.0 percent), and the second reform by 1.05 percentage points. 
While sizable, these efects are smaller than those implied by earlier studies that did 
not have as detailed data on the number of prior UI applications. When we approximate 
the methodology of previous studies by not accounting for the number of prior UI spells, 
we estimate a layof reduction from the frst reform of 0.35 percentage points, much 
smaller than earlier estimates of 0.53 percentage points (Van Doornik et al. 2018) to 0.69 
percentage points (Carvalho, Corbi, and Narita 2018). 
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Figure 1  Both Eligibility Reforms Reduced the Risk of Layofs 
Under both reforms, 
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Reform 1 − 0.90 
− 1 
Reform 2 
− 1.2 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
Reduction in Collusion 
In the United States, UI benefts are fnanced by experience-rated employer taxes that 
rise with total benefts paid to an employer’s former workers. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
layofs are lower in states where UI taxes rise more quickly with experience-rating (Card 
and Levine 1994). In contrast, Brazilian UI benefts are fnanced from general revenues, 
and neither employers nor workers pay specifc taxes to fnance the program. Consistent 
with this lack of implicit penalty for heavily using the system, Brazilian UI benefts 
appear to subsidize the fow between low-wage, short-term jobs and informal sector 
jobs, in some cases back and forth with the same employer (Doornik, Schoenherr, and 
Skrastins 2017). 
We fnd the eligibility reforms afected this behavior, too. For short-tenure workers 
with no prior UI claims, the probability of being rehired by the same employer within 
4 to 10 months of layof fell by 1.3 percentage points afer the frst reform and 1.8 
percentage points afer the second reform. For short-tenure workers with one prior UI 
Figure 2  Both Eligibility Reforms Also Reduced Job Recall to the Same Employer 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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Brazilian UI benefts 
appear to subsidize the 
fow between low-wage, 
short-term jobs and 
informal sector jobs, in 
some cases back and forth 
with the same employer. 
claim, the frst reform reduced recall to the same employer by 1.7 percentage points, an 
amount similar to workers with no prior UI claims. However, the second reform did not 
appear to afect recalls for these workers. 
Conclusion 
We confrm results of previous research that Brazil’s 2015 increases in UI 
eligibility requirements reduced layofs. However, our results indicate that previous 
studies overestimated these reductions, likely because they were unable to precisely 
measure individuals’ prior UI requests, a key parameter undergirding the changes 
in requirements. When we account for prior UI requests, we fnd that changes in UI 
eligibility rules reduced the chance of layof the most for workers with exactly one 
prior UI beneft receipt spell. Our results provide some evidence that restrictions on 
UI eligibility reduced collusion between workers and employers using UI benefts to 
subsidize wages. 
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